The Launch Services Purchase Act, 10 Years On

On November 5, 1990, President George Bush signed the Launch Services Purchase Act into law, as Title II of the Fiscal Year 1991 NASA Authorization. The LSPA was one of the first legislative initiatives enacted via the efforts of space activists, and the first to have a significant impact on national space policy.

The purpose of the LSPA was simple and profound: to prohibit NASA from launching satellites into space. Given that NASA launched virtually all US civil spacecraft prior to 1990, this prohibition was a dramatic reversal of US space policy. Ironically, the LSPA has been so successful that many cannot conceive of a time when NASA held a monopoly as the nation's civil space launch services provider.

Prior to the Challenger disaster, national space policy directed all customers for launch services to the Space Shuttle. Even commercial communications satellites were launched in the Shuttle payload bay, and the traditional Expendable Launch Vehicles were being forced into retirement by a generous subsidy offered by NASA for private customers to fly on the Shuttle. With the 1996 Challenger accident, a re-thinking of national space transportation policy culminated in 1988 with a directive to move commercial payloads from the Shuttle back to ELVs. However, NASA continued to manage ELV launches for civil space customers.

The loss of Challenger provoked a major re-thinking of space policy among space activist groups, as well. Although there had been limited thinking about the need for cheap access to space within the L5 Society, the major space activist organization at that time, and its chapters, most expected -prior to 1986 - that the Space Shuttle would ultimately increase its flight rate to the point that launch costs would drop to levels sufficient to fly large numbers of non-astronauts into space. The Challenger accident forced the realization that the Shuttle would never be a sufficiently affordable vehicle for the 'average' person to ride. This extremely disappointing moment was the precise instant in which new directions were opened to the space activist movement.

A New Beginning

Several members of the Tucson chapter of the L5 Society, Mark Voelker and Ron Nichols recalled an early idea conceived and advocated in the early 1980's by noted science fiction author Dr. Jerry Pournelle - that the US government should offer to pay $500 a pound launched to orbit by private companies, even if the payload were only sand. The Tucson L5 chapter pursued this idea as the basis for Federal legislation that would create a new market for launch services companies. Unfortunately, when they approached their congressman, Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), they were told that there was no way that Congress would appropriate funds for a 'sand in orbit' program.

During late 1987, the Tucson L5 members looked to members of another L5 chapter, San Diego L5, for new ideas about how to formulate national space transportation policy that would promote cheap access to space. The San Diego L5 members, primarily Dr. Andy Cutler, David Anderman, Mike Byron and Jim Bowery responded that the legislation should address the core problem with civil space transportation - that the government operated the transportation system. The result of this interchange was the generation of the Launch Services Purchase Act, legislation that effectively barred NASA from operating space launchers (excluding the Space Shuttle).

The logic behind the LSPA was that the government was the least efficient and effective operator of space transportation systems, and that if the private sector were freed from the constraints of government management of their systems, and also freed from the specter of government competition for their customers, the private sector would respond by creating ever cheaper launchers to meet an ever growing market enlarged by these new cheaper launchers. This feedback cycle had worked in other fields, most spectacularly in computing services. Moreover, the LSPA would put the government in the position of customer for launch services, so the NASA budget would help serve as part of that feedback cycle. Moreover, it was obvious to most space industry observers that NASA was indeed extremely ineffective in managing space launch. One observer noted that NASA would pay $80 million for a Delta launcher, for which the military would pay only $45 million for the same type launcher, with most of extra funding required to support NASA paperwork requirements. It was often stated that "NASA wouldn't launch a rocket until the paperwork weighed as much as the vehicle". Despite all this paperwork, 1986 had been a particularly bad year for government launch operations.

The two L5 chapters agreed that the Tucson chapter would create the first draft of the bill, and the San Diego chapter would edit the bill, and present the work to Congressman Ron Packard (R-CA), who at that time was a member of the congressional panel with oversight and policy-making authority over NASA. The Tucson chapter would also continue to work with Congressman Kolbe in order to have a back-up sponsor for the bill, and as a possible initial co-sponsor.

The process of creating and editing the bill was an arduous task, made more so by NASA supporters within the space activist movement who felt that the LSPA would damage NASA. During much of the first half of 1988, the NASA supporters within the space activist movement threatened to produce an alternative version of the LSPA, one that would continue to support NASA management of launch services. Some of the principals of this anti-LSPA effort included, strangely enough, officials at AMROC, a new commercial launch services company, and the National Space Society (NSS), which had emerged as a result of the merger of the L5 Society and the National Space Institute, a Washington DC based pro-NASA organization.

A final draft of the bill was ready for presentation to Congressman Packard in Spring, 1988, despite the activities of the anti-LSPA group. The first meeting between the members of San Diego L5 and Congressman Packard was held at the congressional field office in Carlsbad, California, and was attended by about 10 members of the local group, including two constituents. Congressman Packard's attitude towards the bill could be characterized more by curiosity than acceptance, since it was difficult for him to conceive of a group of pro-space activists wanting to limit NASA's role in space. Despite his skepticism, the members of San Diego L5 continued to communicate with Congressman Packard, and by the beginning of the next congressional session, early 1989, he agreed to sponsor the legislation. News of the impending introduction of the LSPA prompted a firestorm of activity by the anti-LSPA activists, who attempted to convince Packard congressional staffers that the LSPA was poor national space policy, and should be re-written.

These efforts were largely ignored, and the bill was introduced in June, 1989 with co-sponsorship from Congressmen Kolbe, and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). The efforts of Tim Kyger, a legislative assistance for Congressman Rohrabacher, in supporting the LSPA on Capitol Hill cannot be underestimated. Along with Jim Muncy, Kyger carried the load for the LSPA in those difficult times.

Despite the introduction of the bill in Congress, there was little chance that the bill would ever become law, if only because Congressman Packard was not that interested in actually passing the bill, and he was a minority member of the Congressional Space committee at the time, with little actual power over passage of legislation. Congressman Packard may have thought that he was doing his constituents a small favor by introducing the LSPA, but even he didn't see the firestorm that was provoked by the introduction of the bill.

The Firestorm

The activities of the anti-LSPA group were minor irritants during the process of formulating the bill, and were virtually negligible once the bill reached Capitol Hill. What did matter was the attitude of NASA towards the LSPA, and NASA responded in an extremely negative manner. Although the LSPA was perceived at first by most as a minor piece of doomed legislation, NASA treated the bill as if it were the four horsemen of the apocalypse, an incoming asteroid, and the IRS rolled into one giant threat. Even Congressman Packard was shocked by the negative response of the space agency, to the point where he was publicly quoted (in Aviation Week) as having to "knock heads at NASA" to reduce their opposition to the bill. For some inexplicable reason, the congressman viewed NASA as a public agency that should follow the guidance of Congress. The active opposition by NASA to the LSPA changed Packard's view of the bill as a favor to constituents to a holy crusade.

Despite Packard's conversion on the issue, the hard reality was that enactment of the LSPA would require broad bi-partisan support within Congress- three co-sponsors alone were not enough to pass the bill. San Diego L5 embarked on a national campaign to pass the LSPA. This would require a level of effort far in excess of what was considered possible in 1989.

The NSS lobbying organization, SpaceCause, was approached as the logical organization to work the congressional staffs on Capitol Hill. Unfortunately, SpaceCause declined to support the LSPA, and was generally hostile to the enactment effort (some of its officials had participated in the earlier anti-LSPA faction). At one point, NSS/SpaceCause leadership attempted to form a new NSS chapter based in Congressman Packard's district, one that would have an anti-LSPA effort. This new chapter ultimately failed to survive after its new members were briefed on the merits of the LSPA, and most opted to join San Diego L5. With SpaceCause declining to support the LSPA, San Diego L5 was left as the principal mover in the pro-LSPA coalition, and some of its members, principally Cutler and Bowery, dedicated a good portion of their lives for the next two years attempting to pass the LSPA.

By Fall of 1989, it was recognized that the LSPA needed a leading Democrat to co-sponsor the bill - and soon - for there to be a chance to pass the bill. A Riverside area space activist, David Bliss, residing in the district of the late Congressman George Brown (D-CA), offered to help set up a meeting between Cutler and Bowery and Mr. Brown. Bliss recruited some friends in the area to attend the meeting as local constituent support, and three members of San Diego commuted to Riverside to meet with Congressman Brown in December, 1989. A 30 minute meeting extended to 2 hours, and at the conclusion, Congressman Brown signed on as a co-sponsor of the LSPA.

With the LSPA gaining momentum, a national, informal network of space activists came into existence, with the result that dozens of space activists briefing their congresspersons to urge their support for the bill. This network was later re-activated during the many budget battles over the DC-X program, and was ultimately burned out over the latter issue. The rise of the Internet as a communications tool, and ProSpace and the Space Frontier Foundation as an effective nexus for space activists replaced the prior informal network, with both positive and negative results.

During 1990, space activists frantically organized congressional briefings, supported pro-space congressional candidates (at one point, two members of San Diego L5 re-located to Congressman Brown's district to work full time on his re-election campaign, which he won by a handful of votes), and counted the co-sponsorships one by one.

Congressional hearings on the bill were attended by representatives of the space launch industry, who were extremely supportive. An official from General Dynamics, the producer of the Atlas launcher, claimed that enactment of the LSPA would drop launch costs to NASA by 30% in the near term (the ultimate savings was effectively almost 50%, as NASA pays today for Deltas prices similar to what the military paid in the 1980's).

This work paid off in November, 1990 when the LSPA was enacted as Title II of the FY 1991 NASA Authorization bill, signed into law by President Bush.

The results were immediate and dramatic. Within six months, General Dynamics decided to fund the construction of 60 new Atlas launchers, prior to a single customer signing. The major aerospace companies eyed new commercial launchers, designed to be cheaper to operate.

After initial resistance, NASA ultimately acceded to Congressman Rohrabacher's demand that a line item for Launch Services Purchases be added to the NASA budget request, and an office for launch services procurement was established at NASA headquarters. This office focuses on securing affordable and reliable space transportation for NASA, precisely the result hoped for by the initial authors of the Launch Services Purchase Act.

More importantly, a launch services market exists today. Although there is the possibility that the market may diminish in the short term due to external effects or more efficient payloads, there is no longer a question that this market will ultimately lead to ever cheaper space transportation.

New legislation modeled on the LSPA - the Space Science Data Purchase Act - was enacted in 1998, as part of the Commercial Space Act of 1998. This bill would authorize the government to purchase space science data from private vendors, much as the government buys launch services from private vendors. This new legislation has not been implemented, and awaits support from space activists for an initial appropriation for a data purchase, perhaps a survey of the lunar poles by a radar satellite built and flown by private firms.

Conclusion

So, why aren't we all flying in space today, as a result of this work? The immediate answer is that markets take time to impact the supply chain, and with the enormous investment required to build new space launchers, the full effects of market forces will not be seen for some time. Still, the progress since 1990 has been considerable.  At least one should think about the reality that - without the Launch Services Purchase Act - that NASA may have elected to *manage* the X-Prize.

It would be more appropriate to comment on the reason for the current disappointment in the progress at this juncture - our expectations were increased to unrealistic levels due to the initial success of the DC-X Delta Clipper. Reusable Launch Vehicles were seen as a 'magic bullet' that would force the market to skip several iterations in moving directly to cheap access to space. Whether the government or private capital was to fund these RLVs, the initial market was to people or the new mobile satellite telephone constellations that would blacken the sky with telecom satellites. This 'magic bullet' effectively shot the space activist movement instead of the RLVs, with the unforeseen result that RLVs are effectively in limbo at the same moment that existing and emerging ELVs are threatening to saturate the launch market.

The major open question is whether the satellite operators will respond to these new, cheaper launchers with cheaper payloads. If so, the expanded launch market may result in even cheaper launchers, perhaps even RLVs, in operation shortly.

Disillusionment with the failure of RLVs to open the space frontier, however, may result in activists looking to the government to solve the problem, either with new RLVs or to contravene the LSPA by launching payloads itself. Activists should remember that the government cannot determine the size or nature of the launch services market, and thus cannot create a system to serve that market. The strength of the government is in serving as a component of that launch services market, a customer with deep pockets.

The LSPA was the first step for the pro-space community in forcing open the door to the space frontier. The largest lesson of the successful enactment effort has been that *we can create a new future*, that we don't have to sit back and wait for someone else to open the space frontier at their convenience. There has been considerable progress in that direction in the last 10 years, but the next steps await us.